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Abstract 
This research note performs some limited empirical assessments of the Baran and Sweezy 
(1966) contention that most research and development (R&D) efforts in the US are “wasted” at 
the macroeconomic level in that as R&D succeeds by absorbing a little of the excess economic 
surplus generated by a capitalist system, it still fails to generate a lot of innovation of a 
transformative nature.  At an aggregate level, greater R&D efforts are correlated with higher 
worker productivity and standards of living, which is to be expected according to mainstream 
economic theory and literature.  Yet, R&D efforts regarding job creation, new firm creation, and 
net business investment show either mixed results or even negative connections.  There is some 
preliminary empirical support in this paper for many aspects of the Baran and Sweezy point of 
view on R&D, and these findings also hint that R&D is used in a monopoly capital system to 
further monopolization.  The findings of this note also may help to explain how productivity 
gains and innovation over the last few decades may not be benefitting the typical worker or the 
creation of small businesses as well.  
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Introduction 
 In their classic book Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social 
Order (1966), Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy argued that a capitalist economic system 
chronically suffers from a tendency to stagnate because not enough capitalist profits and earnings 
(also part of an “economic surplus”) cannot be invested rapidly and productively enough in order 
to keep the system growing with full potential output and employment.  That is, there exists 
“excess surplus” which is not always re-invested.  The authors outlined some ways in which this 
surplus could be absorbed in order to help the economic system avoid stagnation, even though 
the investment mechanisms or conduits for excess surplus could be considered “wasteful” or 
unproductive from a societal point of view.   These ways or methods included increased defense 
spending, some civilian government spending (e.g., welfare), corporate spending on advertising, 
promotions and product differentiation, foreign investment, and research and development, 
especially corporate research and development (R&D).1   
 The notion that most R&D efforts are wasteful would probably strike most mainstream 
economists and proponents of innovation as outrageous, unfounded and absurd.2  Baran and 
Sweezy would also probably claim that much government R&D is wasteful since a lot of 
government-initiated R&D relates to defense spending.  Yet those who believe that R&D efforts 
lead to greater innovation, greater worker productivity, and better standards of living claim that 
R&D is necessary for economic growth and development.  The role that innovation, and along 
with it the often-parallel concept of entrepreneurship, plays in keeping a capitalist economy 
                                                          
1 Lambert and Kown (2015) argue that nations with higher levels of these forms of surplus absorption usually 
display high levels of economic inefficiency.    
2 Viki (2016) cites research by a consulting firm that shows no relationship between a firm’s level of R&D spending 
and its financial performance.   
3 
 
dynamic and growing has been a dominant and persistent theme in most of the economics 
literature at least since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776).  These were themes especially 
studied by and written about by the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942, 1983), whom 
Sweezy knew as a friend and sometimes debated in person and in writings on capitalist 
innovation (Samuelson 1969 and 1972, Foster 1999 and 2011).   
Schumpeter’s writings on innovation and entrepreneurship have received a great deal of 
attention over the decades (Schumpeter 1942 and 1983, Blaug 1997 pp. 445-446).  As with 
mainstream economics, Schumpeter once believed that the role of the small entrepreneur was 
crucial in bringing about innovation, new jobs, and rising standards of living.  Additionally, the 
entrepreneur was also seen as an antidote to large business concentration in that established 
industries are sometimes usurped by upstart business and new technologies that replace older 
businesses and technology.  According to Schumpeter, the process of “creative destruction” is 
one in which older industries are replaced by newer ones thanks to the decline of the older 
industries and their products and the rise of new products due to entrepreneurship (Schumpeter 
1983).  Newer industries, however, eventually become mature ones, and their products and 
services eventually saturate markets.  If innovations appear in clusters, and then after their 
appearances there is a subsequent period of an innovation “drought”, then an economic downturn 
is likely to occur.  These were the findings of Edmonson (2009) as well regarding the 
performance of the US economy, although he says large organizations play the primary role in 
innovation.   
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However, Schumpeter 3began to see large corporations as a source of innovation and 
rising standards of living.  These organizations had the financial and industrial capacity to 
develop new products, although he also thought that the decline of small business as a source of 
innovation would eventually cause the middle classes to lose a lot of confidence in the capitalist 
system since small business and profitable innovation were vehicles of class mobility 
(Schumpeter 1942, Foster 2011).  The observation that larger businesses are more successful at 
substantive innovation is borne out by more modern writings, some of which believe that R&D 
conducted by highly monopolized industries and large firms is a benefit (Kamien and Schwartz 
1982, Darby and Zucker 2006) whereas others see it as a cause for alarm and reject a John 
Kenneth Galbraith (1956) view of beneficial innovation coming from large firms and 
concentrated markets  (Nelson, Peck and Kalachek 1967) .   
Schumpeter is thought to have had an influence on Paul M. Sweezy’s thinking regarding 
innovation, business cycles and economic growth (Foster 2014, Baran and Sweezy 2017), 
although Schumpeter thought that firms, whether large or small, pursued innovation with profits 
as a goal whereas Sweezy thought that profits or surplus, or the accumulation of profits or 
surplus, came first, and then firms looked for investment outlets through innovation to absorb the 
surplus (Schumpeter 1942, Sweezy 1942 and 1953, Foster 2011).  Romer (2012) in his textbook, 
assumes in his models the Schumpeterian view.  For Schumpeter, economic crises mostly arose 
due to innovation cycles wherein sometimes not enough new innovations were forthcoming to 
yield new products and new industries so as to keep an economy growing.  For Sweezy 
economic crises arose from a lack of surplus absorption wherein the number of new innovative 
                                                          
3 Edmonson (2009) also notes this, but also sees governments and large universities as sources of innovation as 
well.   
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products and businesses were not enough to absorb all the surplus generated in a capitalist 
economy, and so growth stagnated as a growing portion of surplus failed to be reinvested.  In 
general, for Schumpeter, innovators and innovation chased after profits, whereas for Sweezy, 
profits pursued or looked for possible innovation as an investment outlet (Schumpeter 1942, 
Sweezy 1942 and 1953, Foster 2011).  Samuelson (1969, 1972) and Foster (1999, 2011) have 
written about a congenial, public debate held at Harvard University during the 1946-47 school 
year between Schumpeter and Sweezy on their opposing ideas.   
Additionally, Baran and Sweezy (1966) use their Table 1 in Chapter 4 to note there does 
not appear to be that much of a connection between corporate R&D and outlays on plant and 
equipment from 1953 to 1962 (pages 107-110), although there does appear to be a connection 
between these outlays and depreciation allowances.  Also, since R&D is a cost of production 
rather than a spending item that comes after profits are counted (which would then definitely 
make R&D some form of re-investment), one cannot claim that R&D generates a great amount 
of net investment.  They write: 
“Without claiming that these data constitute proof, we nevertheless do believe that they 
provide strong support for the view that there is little if any correlation between 
innovation and investment outlets, and thus monopoly capitalism is increasingly able to 
take care of its investment needs from depreciation allowances.” (page 109), and 
“Finally, our conclusion is that technological progress is no more likely than population 
growth to make a significant contribution to solving the problem of surplus absorption.” 
(page 110). 
In fact, when the author of this paper expresses the dollar values in their table as percentages of 
GDP for each respective year, he finds a negative Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.44 
between R&D spending as a percent of GDP and outlays on plant and equipment as a percent of 
GDP as well as a negative coefficient of -0.30 between depreciation allowances as a percent of 
GDP and outlays on plant and equipment as a percent of GDP.  However, neither coefficient is 
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statistically significant, and so R&D does not seem to make much of an impact on investment, 
although only ten years of data is analyzed.4  Finally, these numbers and analyses do not address 
variations at the industry level, or, more specifically, do not address the possibility if innovation 
in one industry stimulates investment in it yet causes disinvestment in other industries which 
may be non-innovative or have products or technology in decline.  Nonetheless, Baran and 
Sweezy were only concerned with looking at aggregate numbers since their focus is on how 
innovation affects macroeconomic conditions.  Aggregate numbers are also the focus of this 
paper.       
 Baran and Sweezy (1966) do not mention explicitly how innovation and R&D may 
impact worker productivity, job creation, new business formation, and other possible effects of 
greater R&D and new products and/or new innovations.  To fill this void, this paper looks at how 
R&D efforts may affect other economic outcomes in addition to investment.  This paper 
proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the research methods employed in and results 
found in this paper.  This is followed by a further discussion of the results along with a 
conclusion and comments on the implications of the research findings.   
Methods and Results 
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here) 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in various models.  To test 
whether spending on patents is perhaps “wasted” or ineffective, and over different lengths of 
                                                          
4 When an index of macro level R&D efforts from 1947 to 2015 is created (see Methods section), the index turns 
out to be highly correlated (r = 0.87) with depreciation allowances for fixed assets as a percentage of GDP (US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 1947 to 2015) and the correlation is statistically significant.  This is something which 
would be expected given Baran and Sweezy’s (1966) claim that depreciation expenses by most large corporations 
could be used to finance their R&D work (pages 107-109). 
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time spans, the independent variable R&D Efforts was created using factor analysis from several 
highly correlated variables (see Table 2) such as spending on R&D as a percent of GDP; real 
R&D expenditure in billions of dollars per real GDP per capita5; utility patents granted to 
residents per real GDP per capita; design patents granted per real GDP per capita6; patents 
granted to foreign residents per real GDP per capita7; and real expenditures per utility patents 
granted.8  Looking at US Patent and Trademark data (USPTO 1963 to 2015 and 1969 to 2015) it 
appears for utility patents (“inventions”) that the ratio of the number of organizational patents 
(i.e., patents granted to corporations, universities, and governments) to the number of patents 
granted to individuals has increased from the early 1970s to recent years from around a factor of 
over 2 to around 6 indicating a greater and greater role played by organizational R&D.  The 
greatest number of these patents come from corporate R&D efforts, although Isenberg (2010) 
and Mazzacuto (2015) has argued that the most impactful innovations have come from 
governmental R&D efforts or from private R&D efforts supported by the government since some 
high stakes research and innovation need government resources and assistance since 
development costs are extremely high, perhaps too high even for large corporations.  This is also 
a point of view of institutionalist economics (Galbraith 1956) as well as those subscribing to a 
                                                          
5 Caballero and Jaffe (2002) among others indicate that patent generation should be put on some type of real GDP 
basis, and so this is done here in this paper. They also note that innovation diffusion occurs rapidly, and therefore 
create models in which R&D efforts are quickly realized once a patent is approved.   
6 Since the Baran and Sweezy and Monthly Review School (Foster 2014) tradition holds that most R&D efforts are 
wasteful, this variable is included since design patents mostly affect the appearance of product and not its 
substance.  This is “wasteful” in the sense that such design and packaging efforts are part of the sales efforts of 
large corporations, which is also wasteful.  Nonetheless, business entities engage in such practices because it often 
helps them with product positioning, possible gains in market share and greater sales, so from a corporate point of 
view, such efforts are not wasteful.  The percentage of patents granted that are in this category grew dramatically 
over the decades that were examined in this paper. 
7 This category of patents also experience growth during the decades examined, and is also included because 
patents to foreign residents can be and often are utilized and employed in US domestic production efforts.   
8 Over the time period examined, this value grew in size perhaps indicating that R&D efforts have mostly become 
the domain of governmental entities, universities, and large corporations which have the wherewithal to conduct 
R&D through large and expensive laboratories, testing centers, etc.  
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monopoly capital point of view (O’Connor 1973, Foster 2014).  In this way, the government also 
helps with surplus absorption.     
Table 2 shows a high degree of correlation of these variables with Factor 1, and so the 
scores of Factor 1 are chosen as the values for the variable R&D Efforts, which is used to predict 
the dependent variables listed in Table 3.  When necessary and as indicated by Breusch-Godfrey 
tests for serial correlation, Newey-West standard errors are used and are displayed in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
 In examining Table 3, the index R&D Efforts is a statistically predictor of and explains 
around 93% of the variation in a real GDP per worker index with a base year of 2012 (US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1947-2015).  This supports the writings of neoclassical economists 
who have written extensively on how innovation is a key to raising worker productivity and 
standards of living (Griliches 1984, Zachariadis 2003, Romer 2012).  Since most of the literature 
claims that the aggregate effects of patents are almost instantly felt in the marketplace and put 
into use,9 or that innovation, its implementation, and its impact are usually contemporaneous in 
the aggregate (e.g., Pakes 1985, Caballero and Jaffe 2002, 146-147, Hall, Thoma, and Torirsi 
2007, Gurmu and Perez-Sebastian 2008), the values of the R&D Efforts index are regressed with 
                                                          
9 One exception is the research by Mansfield (1968 and 1971) who showed that the diffusion of new production 
innovations could be slow in certain non-competitive, industries unless investment in the new innovations were 
relatively inexpensive and could show large profits quickly.  Otherwise, investment in new technologies were often 
delayed unless the industry was competitive.  On the other hand, larger firms did move faster on average than 
smaller ones in adopting new production innovations (machinery, techniques, etc.).  Mansfield also noted that 
there can be a significant number of lag years between the time something is invented and then put into use, or 
becomes an innovation.  However, Mansfield was not concerned so much about the aggregate impact of patents 
and R&D spending as he was with the diffusion of the innovations within and across industries yielded by 
inventions which had been patented.  Even if implemented by only a handful of firms, the company holding the 
patent sees an immediate benefit in sales of its invention.  He also did not look at the invention and diffusion of 
consumer products which tend to have more immediate impacts in the marketplace than inventions used in 
production settings. 
9 
 
the real GDP per worker variable without any time lags.  This is done with all the variables in 
Table 3.10  For output per worker, Table 3 shows a one unit increase in the index is associated 
with an increase of 21.83 points in the real output index.   
 On the other hand, Table 3 indicates that R&D does not appear to have any connection to 
gross domestic investment (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 1947-2015), yet it is significantly, 
moderately, and inversely correlated with net domestic, private business investment (US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 1947-2015).  A one unit increase in the R&D Efforts index is associated 
with a 1.73 percent decline in net domestic business investment.  This somewhat supports the 
Monthly Review (MR) School point of view that although innovation can increase profit margins 
through increasing worker productivity, in mature industries any increases in output per worker 
have to be partially offset by increases in unused plant and equipment capacity, or otherwise a 
glut of products and services are created, which in turn can lead to lower prices, disruptive price 
competition, and lower profits among oligopolistic competitors (Steindl 1956, Baran and Sweezy 
1966, Kalecki 2009. and Foster 2014).11  If worker output per hour is increased, then some 
workers and equipment have to be idled.  Profits due to innovation and greater productivity are 
not fully absorbed thanks to a reduction in some forms of investment, and so surplus absorption 
is only partially accomplished.  Therefore, according to the MR School, it is sometimes not in 
the interests of big businesses to innovate unless an innovation helps them to better utilize their 
existing labor, plant and equipment, and sometimes it is in their interests not to adopt innovations 
which may weaken or reduce the value of their existing plant and equipment or which may fall 
                                                          
10 In testing some models using lags of 5 or 10 years, the results did not differ that much. Results can be furnished 
upon request by the author.   
11 Veblen (1899), known as an institutionalist economist, claims that most innovation is subordinated to the 
pecuniary interests of the firm.  Regardless of usefulness, financial considerations are more important when it 
comes to new products, new production techniques, etc.  
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short of targeted returns on investment (Foster 2014, Chapter 4).12  Sometimes new product plans 
are dropped if the new and innovative products cannot attain a large corporation’s target profit 
rates, such as Pfizer dropping plans to develop and market new drugs for treating Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s diseases, even though such drugs would have very high demand.   
Unlike the time periods corresponding to the arrival of innovations such as the steam 
engine, railroads, and the automobile, most of the 20th century saw the ascendancy of 
oligopolistic industries in which innovation played a lesser role in profitability, and so net 
domestic investment would be predicted to slow down compared to investment rates of the 19th 
century (Steindl 1956, Baran and Sweezy 1966, Kalecki 2009, and Foster 2014).  It should be 
noted that two elements of the index, ornamental patents (patents for product and package 
designs) and patents granted to foreign residents, increased dramatically during this time period, 
and these patents may not have the same type of investment effects as utility (invention) patents. 
Finally, some writers have noted the slowdown in net private business investment in recent 
decades.  Some attribute it to the fact that much new business investment has been relatively 
costless with many intangible assets being employed now compared to other forms of investment 
made in previous times (Haskel and Westlake 2018), and some have noted that the net impact of 
much innovation in the last few decades has perhaps destroyed more jobs than created new ones, 
and this net job destruction has also exacerbated income inequality (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014, Josifidis and Supic 2018).  These trends would support the monopoly capital view in that, 
                                                          
12 In fact, Foster (2014, Chapter 4) asserts that, as Braverman (1974) noted, one of the biggest innovations of the 
20th century was the introduction of scientific management into production and office settings, something which 
boosted labor productivity in addition to physical investments in plant and equipment.   
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in the drive toward efficiency and greater profitability, much old investment and forms of labor 
have to be rendered obsolete, which in turn limits surplus absorption.   
 At the same, as shown in Table 3, R&D Efforts is significantly and positively correlated 
with corporate profits after taxes as a percentage of GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
1947-2015) and the performance of the Standard and Poor’s Stock Market Index (S&P Historical 
Prices by Year 1871-2018).  The index is not correlated at all with Fortune 500 profits as a 
percentage of GDP, however, and is only weakly correlated with overall corporate profits as a 
percentage of GDP.  Yet it does explain about 75% of the variation in the value of the S&P Index 
from 1947 to 2015.  This anomaly can possibly be explained by the fact that although R&D does 
not directly increase overall profits (although it may increase product profit margins), it does 
make innovating firms more attractive to investors, and so the market value of S&P firms as 
expressed in the index would be expected to increase as these large firms experienced gains in 
productivity.   
To examine what effects the R&D Efforts index has on job, entrepreneurship, and small 
business creation, the next set of dependent variables listed in Table 3 are used.  Innovation and 
the introduction of new products and the creation of new markets play large roles in economic 
growth and development theory.  The pursuit of profit is a primary motivator for inventors and 
entrepreneurs, and new products and businesses not only serve the needs of an expanding 
population but more importantly can also serve as a major source of innovation, which in turn is 
assumed to be a source of rising standards of living (Harrison 2015, Decker, Haltiwangerb, 
Jarmind, and Miranda 2016).  In forming small enterprises which can sometimes later grow into 
larger ones, entrepreneurs can enhance existing products and markets or create new products, 
markets, profits, and employment that help to keep an economy dynamic and thriving (US Small 
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Business Administration 2012a).13  As the businesses and products/services of one generation of 
entrepreneurs reach a maturity or saturation stage of the product life cycle (Levitt 1965), new 
businesses are formed every year which in turn should keep an economy expanding.  Despite 
numerous small (and usually less numerous large) business closures every year, there are enough 
new innovations and inventions, new small businesses and products that survive to help 
guarantee that a free enterprise or capitalistic economy continues to grow (Romer 1990, Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin 1995, Jones 2002, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda 2010, Harrison 2015, Decker, Haltiwangerb, Jarmind, and Miranda 2016).  Therefore, 
within neoclassical or mainstream economic theory, innovation, entrepreneurship and the 
flourishing of small businesses are two possible ways that a capitalistic economy could avoid 
future or worse than would be otherwise stagnation and decline.  Innovation is often credited 
with helping small business formation, helping net job creation, enhancing competition by giving 
small and new entrants into a market a competitive edge, hence making many markets more 
competitive, and destroying some older and obsolete firms. Perry (2016) notes the amount of 
churning in the Fortune 500 list from 1955 to 2016 and notes that only a small percentage of 
firms on the list in 1955 are still on the list in 2016, although many of the firms on the list 
changed their names or merged with other large firms to create new entities during this time 
period.  The monopoly capital school of thought, however, would point out that the lack of the 
                                                          
13 The US Small Business Administration (SBA) claims that small businesses accounted for around “64% of the net 
new jobs created between 1993 and 2011 (or 11.8 million of the 18.5 million net new jobs)” (US Small Business 
Administration 2012a, page 1).  The same source also states that small businesses are far more productive than 
their larger counterparts in generating patents per employee by a 16 to 1 ratio over a comparable period of time.  
Additionally, the product life cycle theory (Levitt 1965) states that as new, innovative and successful products are 
introduced into an economy, the industries and firms that produce the new products initially expand in terms of 
employment, sales, and household consumption (the introductory and growth stages of the cycle). Later such 
growth begins to slow until a “maturity” stage of the product life cycle is reached wherein sales, employment, 
profits and market shares plateau, and the number of competitors within an industry usually shrinks.  If a product 
becomes obsolete or is replaced by a new innovation, the industry may go into decline and possibly disappear 
from the marketplace.  
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continued existence of the same large firms is not what is important.  Instead, it is the tendency 
of most markets to tend toward concentration over time, and this is what is harmful to an 
economy when it comes to surplus absorption (Foster 2014).  Evangelista (2018) claims that 
mainstream economics is overly “optimistic” regarding the relationship among innovation, 
technology, and economic growth due to the rise of neo-Shumpeterian analysis and literature 
within economics.  Although he considers himself a type of evolutionary economist and not a 
mainstream one, Nelson (Nelson and Winter 1982) subscribes to a Shumpeterian point of view 
by claiming that entrepreneurship and innovation are keys to economic growth, although he 
disagrees with mainstream economists on the sources of entrepreneurship and innovation and 
values the role of small business over big business in entrepreneurship.   
Contrary to mainstream theory, however, Table 3 shows that the index is negatively 
correlated with net job creation, overall job creation rate, the job creation rate of new 
firms/births, job creation rate births 1 to 4 employees, establishment exit rate, establishment exit 
rate of small firms (1 to 4 employees), and the establishment exit rate of employers of 1,000 of 
more employees (US Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics 1977 to 2015).  All of these 
associations are also statistically significant at α < 0.05, and most of the models have moderate 
adjusted r-squared values with the exception of establishment exit rate of firms 10,000 or more 
employees (only about 9%). 
(Insert Tables 4 and 5 around here) 
  Table 4 shows the results of random effects, generalized least squares regression when 
the number of utility patents granted to Fortune 500 companies is used as a dependent variable 
and is predicted by each Fortune 500 firm’s inflation adjusted revenues in millions for each year 
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from 1969 to 2005 (Fortune 500 1955 to 2005).14  In part A of Table 4, the cases are grouped 
according to year, and in part B they are grouped according to Fortune 500 company.  The 
inflation adjusted revenues variable is a statistically significant predictor of the number of utility 
(invention) patents in each of the models and is a better predictor than when inflation adjusted 
profits are used as an independent variable to predict utility patents granted per year per 
company (see Table 5).  Inflation adjusted profits is a statistically significant independent 
variable but does not explain as much of the variation in utility patents granted as inflation 
adjusted revenues.  This supports the Baran and Sweezy (1966) notion that R&D efforts mostly 
come from revenues and costs of operations15 rather than from profits, which according to them 
indicates that some large, corporate firms have created in-house labs and offices to conduct R&D 
on an ongoing basis, and that such efforts are more of a way to absorb economic surplus rather 
than to generate surplus through profits.   Recall from the discussion above that many writers 
have noted that R&D expenditures on most innovations and the subsequent patenting are fairly 
contemporaneous in time, and so the regression results shown in Table 4 are not that surprising 
from that perspective either. 
(Insert Tables 6 and 7 around here) 
 Beginning in 1981, the federal government started granting a tax credit to companies for 
their research and development efforts (Holtzman 2017, IRS n.d.).  Table 6 shows the results of 
using least squares regression to predict the total number of patents (utility and ornamental) 
                                                          
14 Utility patent data was only available from 1969 and beyond, and easily accessible data from the Fortune 500 
sources only went to 2005.  To access other years beyond 2005 was problematic and also expensive.  It is hoped 
that 37 years of data should be sufficient.   
15 Inflation adjusted revenues minus inflation adjusted profits is equal to inflation adjusted general costs, and when 
costs are estimated, the same results are found for using it as an independent variable as using inflation adjust 
revenues.   
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granted each year from 1947 to 2015 using the dummy, independent variable of R&D Tax Credit 
where 0 is used for the years 1947 to 1980, and 1 is used for the years 1981 to 2015.16  The 
dummy variables is statistically significant and explains about 61% of the variation in patents 
granted per year.  From 1981 to 2015, patents saw an increase of 0.0625 per year more patents 
granted on average.  This shows that perhaps tax considerations gave a boost to patent efforts 
rather than just the pursuit of profits alone.  Figure 1 shows that most of the credits for research 
activities since 1990 have gone to corporations with gross receipts of $250 million or more (US 
Internal Revenue Service 1990 to 2013).    
(Insert Figure 1 around here) 
Conclusion 
 The results of the models displayed in the preliminary analysis by this paper mostly 
support the monopoly capital point of view that R&D expenditures and efforts are not that 
effective, and although not addressed by the monopoly capital school of thought, perhaps R&D 
efforts are also destructive when it comes to net business investment, small business formation, 
job creation, and promoting competition.  Outside of boosting productivity, the only other items 
on which R&D efforts have a positive impact is on corporate share prices (S&P Index) and 
corporate profits, which are to be expected if a firm has a viable research program and the more 
difficult it is to replicate a firm’s innovations due to patenting, according to mainstream 
economic theory (Pakes 1985, Cockburn and Griliches 1988).  Innovation is linked to increases 
in productivity, a claim touted and supported by neoclassical economics, but the increases in 
productivity could be benefitting existing  and larger firms at the expense of newer and smaller 
                                                          
16 The US Internal Revenue Service only has detailed data on tax credits by industry and business size mostly going 
back to 2001, although some data goes back to 1990. 
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ones,17 and so the closure rates of existing firms could be shrinking for this reason as the number 
of new smaller firms and new market entrants keep declining, although the exit rates for existing 
smaller firms has declined.  Most of all, as R&D efforts have increased, the exit rates of larger 
firms have declined as the portion of firms with 500 or more employees has increased.  Table 3 
shows R&D efforts to be positively and significantly associated with the portion of firms of large 
size.  This in turn may be causing a decline in competition in many markets.  Finally, with fewer 
new firms entering markets, this could explain a decline in net business investment over time, 
especially if the number of most existing firms has increased over time, as indicated by Table 3, 
and these firms are not using all of their capacity.  Part of net business investment comes from 
new businesses opening.  Such a situation could also partially explain a slowdown in new job 
creation.      
 All of these trends, in turn, points to possible causes of current and future stagnation in 
the US economy thanks to declining competition, increasing market concentration, less job 
creation (although perhaps greater job stability for those who work in larger firms), less net 
business investment, and greater worker productivity which, in a contradictory way, can 
minimize the need for more workers and at the same time yields greater profits for large 
corporations.  The rise in profits with fewer new investment outlets thanks to fewer new 
businesses, in turn, exacerbates the problem of surplus absorption.  Such are the contradictions of 
a monopoly capital system.       
                                                          
17 As Table 7 shows, when the productivity Index is used to predict the Percentage of Firms in the US of size 500 or 
more employees and the Failure Rate of Firms of size 10,000 or more employees, it is a statistically significant 
predictor with an adjusted r-squared value of 0.713 and 0.082, respectively.  Greater productivity is associated 
with larger average firm size and lower large firm failure rates, all else held constant, over a 39 year period, 1977 
to 2015.    
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Table 1--Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D Exp Pct GDP 71 2.45 0.55 0.98 2.91 
Real R&D Exp Bil$ per Real GDP per Capita 71 5965939.00 2213730.00 1408955.00 9501280.00 
Utility Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 69 2.84 0.84 1.43 5.67 
Design Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 69 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.50 
Patents Granted to Foreign Residents per Real GDP per Capita 69 1.11 0.73 0.11 3.15 
Real Exp per Utility Patents Granted 69 2097291.00 718723.90 546028.80 3391834.00 
Real Output Per Person, Index 2009=100 71 65.49 23.69 29.84 110.00 
Current-Cost Depr. Fixed Assets: Private: Nonresidential Pct GDP 70 8.53 1.46 5.53 10.68 
Gross private domestic investment Pct GDP 71 17.28 1.59 13.40 20.50 
Net Domestic Inv Pct GDP 71 8.26 2.57 1.39 12.86 
Corporate Profits Pct GDP 69 6.82 1.72 3.81 11.24 
S&P Index 72 529.37 656.78 14.83 2789.80 
Net Job Creation 39 1.98 2.27 -4.90 6.60 
Job Creation Rate 39 16.69 2.25 11.50 21.80 
Job Creation Rate Births 39 6.22 1.13 4.20 9.20 
Job Creation Rate Births, 1 to 4 Emp 39 23.05 3.34 16.50 28.50 
Job Destruction Rate 39 14.71 1.85 11.10 18.60 
Establishment Entry Rate 39 12.39 1.83 9.10 17.10 
Establishment Entry Rate, 1 to 4 Emp 39 20.37 2.53 15.10 24.40 
Establishment Exit Rate 39 10.68 1.21 8.60 14.00 
Establishment Exit Rate, 1 to 4 Emp 39 18.05 1.44 15.40 21.80 
Establishment Exit Rate, 10,000+ Emp 39 7.74 1.62 4.30 11.70 
Pct Firms with 500 or more employees 39 0.36 0.03 0.30 0.41 
R&D Effort 69 0.00 1.01 -2.13 2.19 
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Table 2--Factor Analysis 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances      
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
R&D Exp Pct GDP 0.80 0.51 -0.29 0.09 0.02 
Real R&D Exp Bil$ per Real GDP per Capita 0.98 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.00 
Utility Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 0.74 -0.59 -0.28 -0.01 0.02 
Design Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 0.71 -0.51 0.36 0.11 0.09 
Patents Granted to Foreign Residents per Real GDP per Capita 0.95 -0.24 0.05 -0.15 0.02 
Real Exp per Utility Patents Granted 0.51 0.81 0.21 -0.05 0.03 
      
Scoring coeff. (method = Bartlett)  
------------------------------------------------------      
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4  
R&D Exp. Pct. GDP 0.34 0.41 -0.87 1.91  
Real R&D Exp Bil$ per Real GDP per Capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Utility Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 0.18 -0.42 -0.75 0.23  
Design Patents Granted per Real GDP per Capita 0.26 -0.27 1.08 2.49  
Patents Granted to Foreign Residents per Real GDP per Capita 0.33 -0.07 0.12 -3.39  
Real Exp. per Utility Patents Granted 0.18 0.48 0.71 -0.49  
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Table 3--Time Series Linear Regression Models 
         
  Ind. Variable--R&D Effort       
Dependent Variables: b Std. Error  Constant Adj. r-squared n   
Real Output Per Person  21.83** (0.72) (NW SE) 64.22 0.93 69   
Gross private domestic investment 
Pct GDP 0.183 (0.19) (SE) 17.29 -0.002 69   
Net Domestic Inv Pct GDP -1.73** (0.28) (NW SE) 8.37 0.46 69   
Corporate Profits Pct GDP 0.55** (0.25) (NW SE) 6.82 0.09 69   
Fortune 500 Profits Pct GDP 0.25 (0.24) (NW SE) 2.27 0.012 51   
S&P Index 467.99** (40.12) (NW SE) 451.18 0.75 69   
Net Job Creation -1.04** (0.47) (SE) 2.65 0.09 39   
Job Creation Rate -2.55** (0.029) (NW SE) 18.33 0.7 39   
Job Creation Rate Births -1.22** (-0.15) (SE) 7 0.64 39   
Job Creation Rate Births, 1 to 4 Emp -4.04** (0.34) (NW SE) 25.65 0.802 39   
Job Destruction Rate -1.51** (0.33) (SE) 15.68 0.35 39   
Establishment Entry Rate -2.12** 0.29 (SE) 13.75 0.74 39   
Establishment Entry Rate, 1 to 4 
Emp -2.94** (0.29) (NW SE) 22.26 0.74 39   
Establishment Exit Rate -1.26** (0.17) (SE) 11.49 0.59 39   
Establishment Exit Rate, 1 to 4 Emp -1.18** (0.25) (NW SE) 18.81 0.35 39   
Establishment Exit Rate, 10,000+ 
Emp -0.75** (0.34) (NW SE) 8.22 0.09 39   
Pct Firms with 500 or more 
employees 0.04** (0.003) (NW SE) 0.34 0.79 39   
         
**p<0.05         
*p<0.10         
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Table 4--Fortune 500 Revenues and Patents, Panel Data, 1969-2005 
        
Dependent Variable: Number of Patents Granted   
  A) Random Effects, GLS Regression*, Observations Grouped by Year 
    b    
    (SE)    
Inflation Adjusted Revenues in Millions 0.007**    
    (0.0002)    
         
Constant    14.21    
        
r-square within: 0.08      
r-square between: 0.39      
r-square overall: 0.08      
        
n = 18483        
        
*Hausman tests showed no difference between fixed and random effects regression. 
        
        
        
  B) Random Effects, GLS Regression*, Observations Grouped by Company 
    b    
    (SE)    
Inflation Adjusted Revenues in Millions 0.006**    
    (0.0002)    
         
Constant    7.88    
        
r-square within 0.03      
r-square between 0.06      
r-square overall 0.08      
        
n 18478        
        
*Hausman tests showed no difference between fixed and random effects regression. 
        
**p<0.05        
*p<0.10        
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Table 5--Fortune 500 Profits and Patents, Panel Data, 1969-2005 
        
Dependent Variable: Number of Patents Granted   
  A) Random Effects, GLS Regression*, Observations Grouped by Year 
    b    
    (SE)    
Inflation Adjusted Profits in Millions 0.043**    
    (0.002)    
         
Constant    23.99    
        
r-square within: 0.03      
r-square between: 0.22      
r-square overall: 0.03      
        
n = 18137        
        
*Hausman tests showed no difference between fixed and random effects regression. 
        
        
        
  B) Random Effects, GLS Regression*, Observations Grouped by Company 
    b    
    (SE)    
Inflation Adjusted Profits in Millions 0.015**    
    (0.0014)    
         
Constant    15.42    
        
r-square within 0.006      
r-square between 0.004      
r-square overall 0.03      
        
n 1832        
        
*Hausman tests showed no difference between fixed and random effects regression. 
        
**p<0.05        
*p<0.10        
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Table 6--R&D Tax Credit and Number of Utility Patents Granted 
       
Dependent Variable: Number of Utility Patents Granted per Year, 1947-2015 
    b   
    (NW SE)   
R&D Tax Credit Dummy Variable 0.0625**   
    (0.019)   
        
Constant    2.52   
       
Adj. r-square: 0.61     
       
n = 69      
       
**p<0.05        
*p<0.10       
       
       
 
Table 7--Time Series Linear Regression Models 
  
  b 
 
(NW Std. 
Error) 
 Dependent Variable:  Pct. Firms 500+ Employees  
  
  
Real Output Per Person Index, 2009=100 0.00154** 
 (0.0002) 
Constant 0.237 
  
Adjusted r-squared 0.713 
n 39 
  
  
  
 Dependent Variable:  Exit Rates Firms 1000+ Employees 
  
  
Real Output Per Person Index, 2009=100 -0.03** 
 (0.014) 
Constant 10.18 
  
30 
 
Adjusted r-squared 0.082 
n 39 
**p<0.05        
*p<0.10       
 
